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ABSTRACT
Shannon [40] sought security against the attacker with un-
limited computational powers: if an information source con-
veys some information, then Shannon’s attacker will surely
extract that information. Diffie and Hellman [13] refined
Shannon’s attacker model by taking into account the fact
that the real attackers are computationally limited. This
idea became one of the greatest new paradigms in computer
science, and led to modern cryptography.
Shannon also sought security against the attacker with un-
limited logical and observational powers, expressed through
the maxim that ”the enemy knows the system”. This view
is still endorsed in cryptography. The popular formulation,
going back to Kerckhoffs [24], is that ”there is no security
by obscurity”, meaning that the algorithms cannot be kept
obscured from the attacker, and that security should only
rely upon the secret keys. In fact, modern cryptography goes
even further than Shannon or Kerckhoffs in tacitly assuming
that if there is an algorithm that can break the system, then
the attacker will surely find that algorithm. The attacker is
not viewed as an omnipotent computer any more, but he is
still construed as an omnipotent programmer. The ongoing
hackers’ successes seem to justify this view.
So the Diffie-Hellman step from unlimited to limited com-
putational powers has not been extended into a step from
unlimited to limited logical or programming powers. Is the
assumption that all feasible algorithms will eventually be
discovered and implemented really different from the as-
sumption that everything that is computable will eventually
be computed? The present paper explores some ways to re-
fine the current models of the attacker, and of the defender,
by taking into account their limited logical and program-
ming powers. If the adaptive attacker actively queries the
system to seek out its vulnerabilities, can the system gain
some security by actively learning attacker’s methods, and
adapting to them?
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1. INTRODUCTION
New paradigms change the world. In computer science,
they often sneak behind researchers’ backs: the grand vi-
sions often frazzle into minor ripples (like the fifth genera-
tion of programming languages), whereas some modest goals
engender tidal waves with global repercussions (like moving
the cursor by a device with wheels, or connecting remote
computers). So it is not easy to conjure a new paradigm
when you need it.
Perhaps the only readily available method to generate new
paradigms at leisure is by disputing the obvious. Just in
case, I question on this occasion not one, but two generally
endorsed views:
• Kerckhoffs Principle that there is no security by ob-
scurity, and
• Fortification Principle that the defender has to defend
all attack vectors, whereas the attacker only needs to
attack one.
To simplify things a little, I argue that these two princi-
ples as related. The Kerckhoffs Principle demands that a
system should withstand attackers unhindered probing. In
the modern security definitions, this is amplified to the re-
quirement that the system should resist a family of attacks,
irrespective of the details of their algorithms. The adaptive
attackers are thus allowed to query the system, whereas the
system is not allowed to query the attackers. The resulting
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information asymmetry makes security look like a game bi-
ased in favor of the attackers. The Fortification Principle is
an expression of that asymmetry. In economics, information
asymmetry has been recognized as a fundamental problem,
worth the Nobel Prize in Economics for 2001 [44, 3, 42]. In
security research, the problem does not seem to have been
explicitly addressed, but there is, of course, no shortage of
efforts to realize security by obscurity in practice — albeit
without any discernible method. Although the practices of
analyzing the attackers and hiding the systems are hardly
waiting for anyone to invent a new paradigm, I will pur-
sue the possibility that a new paradigm might be sneaking
behind our backs again, like so many old paradigms did.
Outline of the paper
While I am on the subject of security paradigms, I decided
to first spell out a general overview of the old ones. An
attempt at this is in Sec. 2. It is surely incomplete, and
perhaps wrongheaded, but it may help a little. It is difficult
to communicate about the new without an agreement about
the old. Moreover, it will be interesting to hear not only
whether my new paradigms are new, but also whether my
old paradigms are old.
The new security paradigm arising from the slogan ”Know
your enemy” is discussed in Sec. 3. Of course, security engi-
neers often know their enemies, so this is not much of a new
paradigm in practice. But security researchers often require
that systems should be secure against universal families of
attackers, without knowing anything about who the enemy
is at any particular moment. With respect to such static
requirements, a game theoretic analysis of dynamics of se-
curity can be viewed as an almost-new paradigm (with few
previous owners). In Sec.3.1 I point to the practical devel-
opments that lead up to this paradigm, and then in Sec. 3.2
I describe the game of attack vectors, which illustrates it.
This is a very crude view of security process as a game of
incomplete information. I provide a simple pictorial analy-
sis of the strategic interactions in this game, which turn out
to be based on acquiring information about the opponent’s
type and behavior. A sketch of a formal model of security
games of incomplete information, and of the game of attack
vectors, is given in Appendix A.
A brand new security paradigm of ”Applied security by
obscurity” is described in Sec. 4. It is based on the idea
of logical complexity of programs, which leads to one way
programming similarly like computational complexity led to
one way computations. If achieved, one way programming
will be a powerful tool in security games.
A final attempt at a summary, and some comments about
the future research, and the pitfalls, are given in Sec. 5.
Related work
The two new paradigms offer two new tools for the security
toolkit: games of incomplete information, and algorithmic
information theory.
Game theoretic techniques have been used in applied secu-
rity for a long time, since there a need for strategic reasoning
often arises in practice. A typical example from the early
days is [12], where games of imperfect information were used.
Perhaps the simplest more recent game based model are the
attack-defense trees, which boil down to zero-sum extensive
games [27]. Another application of games of imperfect infor-
mation appeared, e.g., in a previous edition of this confer-
ence [31]. Conspicuously, games of incomplete information
do not seem to have been used, which seems appropriate
since they analyze how players keep each other in obscurity.
The coalgebraic presentation of games and response rela-
tions, presented in the Appendix, is closely related with the
formalism used in [36].
The concept of logical complexity, proposed in Sec. 4, is
based on the ideas of algorithmic information theory [26,
41] in general, and in particular on the idea of logical depth
[11, 28, 7]. I propose to formalize logical complexity by lift-
ing logical depth from the Go¨del-Kleene indices to program
specifications [21, 9, 10, 15, 39, 37]. The underlying idea
that a Go¨del-Kleene index of a program can be viewed as
its ”explanation” goes back to Kleene’s idea of realizability
[25] and to Solomonoff’s formalization of inductive inference
[41].
2. OLD SECURITY PARADIGMS
Security means many things to many people. For a soft-
ware engineer, it often means that there are no buffer over-
flows or dangling pointers in the code. For a cryptographer,
it means that any successful attack on the cypher can be
reduced to an algorithm for computing discrete logarithms,
or to integer factorization. For a diplomat, security means
that the enemy cannot read the confidential messages. For
a credit card operator, it means that the total costs of the
fraudulent transactions and of the measures to prevent them
are low, relative to the revenue. For a bee, security means
that no intruder into the beehive will escape her sting. . .
Is it an accident that all these different ideas go under
the same name? What do they really have in common?
They are studied in different sciences, ranging from com-
puter science to biology, by a wide variety of different meth-
ods. Would it be useful to study them together?
2.1 What is security?
If all avatars of security have one thing in common, it is
surely the idea that there are enemies and potential attack-
ers out there. All security concerns, from computation to
politics and biology, come down to averting the adversarial
processes in the environment, that are poised to subvert the
goals of the system. There are, for instance, many kinds of
bugs in software, but only those that the hackers use are a
security concern.
In all engineering disciplines, the system guarantees a
functionality, provided that the environment satisfies some
assumptions. This is the standard assume-guarantee format
of the engineering correctness statements. Such statements
are useful when the environment is passive, so that the as-
sumptions about it remain valid for a while. The essence of
security engineering is that the environment actively seeks
to invalidate system’s assumptions.
Security is thus an adversarial process. In all engineer-
ing disciplines, failures usually arise from engineering errors
and noncompliance. In security, failures arise in spite of the
compliance with the best engineering practices of the mo-
ment. Failures are the first class citizens of security: every
key has a lifetime, and in a sense, every system too. For
all major software systems, we normally expect security up-
dates, which usually arise from attacks, and often inspire
them.
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2.2 Where did security come from?
The earliest examples of security technologies are found
among the earliest documents of civilization. Fig. 1 shows
security tokens with a tamper protection technology from al-
most 6000 years ago. Fig.2 depicts the situation where this
technology was probably used. Alice has a lamb and Bob
has built a secure vault, perhaps with multiple security lev-
els, spacious enough to store both Bob’s and Alice’s assets.
For each of Alice’s assets deposited in the vault, Bob issues a
clay token, with an inscription identifying the asset. Alice’s
tokens are then encased into a bulla, a round, hollow ”en-
velope” of clay, which is then baked to prevent tampering.
When she wants to withdraw her deposits, Alice submits her
bulla to Bob, he breaks it, extracts the tokens, and returns
the goods. Alice can also give her bulla to Carol, who can
also submit it to Bob, to withdraw the goods, or pass on
to Dave. Bullæ can thus be traded, and they facilitate ex-
change economy. The tokens used in the bullæ evolved into
the earliest forms of money, and the inscriptions on them
led to the earliest numeral systems, as well as to Sumerian
cuneiform script, which was one of the earliest alphabets.
Security thus predates literature, science, mathematics, and
even money.
2.3 Where is security going?
Through history, security technologies evolved gradually,
serving the purposes of war and peace, protecting public
resources and private property. As computers pervaded all
aspects of social life, security became interlaced with com-
putation, and security engineering came to be closely related
with computer science. The developments in the realm of
security are nowadays inseparable from the developments in
the realm of computation. The most notable such develop-
ment is, of course, cyber space.
Paradigms of computation
In the beginning, engineers built computers, and wrote pro-
grams to control computations. The platform of computa-
tion was the computer, and it was used to execute algorithms
and calculations, allowing people to discover, e.g., fractals,
and to invent compilers, that allowed them to write and exe-
cute more algorithms and more calculations more efficiently.
Then the operating system became the platform of compu-
tation, and software was developed on top of it. The era of
personal computing and enterprise software broke out. And
then the Internet happened, followed by cellular networks,
and wireless networks, and ad hoc networks, and mixed net-
works. Cyber space emerged as the distance-free space of
instant, costless communication. Nowadays software is de-
veloped to run in cyberspace. The Web is, strictly speaking,
just a software system, albeit a formidable one. A botnet is
also a software system. As social space blends with cyber
space, many social (business, collaborative) processes can
be usefully construed as software systems, that ran on social
networks as hardware. Many social and computational pro-
cesses become inextricable. Table 1 summarizes the crude
picture of the paradigm shifts which led to this remarkable
situation.
But as every person got connected to a computer, and ev-
ery computer to a network, and every network to a network
of networks, computation became interlaced with communi-
cation, and ceased to be programmable. The functioning of
the Web and of web applications is not determined by the
code in the same sense as in a traditional software system:
after all, web applications do include the human users as a
part of their runtime. The fusion of social and computa-
tional processes in cyber-social space leads to a new type of
information processing, where the purposeful program ex-
ecutions at the network nodes are supplemented by spon-
taneous data-driven evolution of network links. While the
network emerges as the new computer, data and metadata
become inseparable, and a new type of security problems
arises.
Paradigms of security
In early computer systems, security tasks mainly concerned
sharing of the computing resources. In computer networks,
security goals expanded to include information protection.
Both computer security and information security essentially
depend on a clear distinction between the secure areas, and
the insecure areas, separated by a security perimeter. Secu-
rity engineering caters for computer security and for infor-
mation security by providing the tools to build the security
perimeter. In cyber space, the secure areas are separated
from the insecure areas by the ”walls” of cryptography; and
they are connected by the ”gates” of cryptographic proto-
cols.1 But as networks of computers and devices spread
through physical and social spaces, the distinctions between
the secure and the insecure areas become blurred. And in
such areas of cyber-social space, information processing does
not yield to programming, and cannot be secured just by
cryptography and protocols. What else is there?
3. A SECOND-HAND BUT ALMOST-NEW
SECURITY PARADIGM: KNOW YOUR
ENEMY
3.1 Security beyond architecture
Let us take a closer look at the paradigm shift to post-
modern cyber security in Table 2. It can be illustrated as
the shift from Fig. 3 to Fig. 4. The fortification in Fig. 3
represents the view that security is in essence an architec-
tural task. A fortress consists of walls and gates, separating
the secure area within from the insecure area outside. The
boundary between these two areas is the security perime-
ter. The secure area may be further subdivided into the
areas of higher security and the areas of lower security. In
cyber space, as we mentioned, the walls are realized using
crypto systems, whereas the gates are authentication pro-
tocols. But as every fortress owner knows , the walls and
the gates are not enough for security: you also need some
soldiers to defend it, and some weapons to arm the soldiers,
and some craftsmen to build the weapons, and so on. More-
over, you also need police and judges to maintain security
within the fortress. They take care for the dynamic aspects
1This is, of course, a blatant oversimplification, as are many
other statements I make. In a sense, every statement is an
oversimplification of reality, abstracting away the matters
deemed irrelevant. The gentle reader is invited to squint
whenever any of the details that I omit do seem relevant,
and add them to the picture. The shape of a forest should
not change when some trees are enhanced.
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Figure 1: Tamper protection from 3700 BC
AliceBob
Figure 2: To withdraw her sheep from Bob’s
secure vault, Alice submits a tamper-proof
token from Fig. 1.
age ancient times middle ages modern times
platform computer operating system network
applications Quicksort, compilers MS Word, Oracle WWW, botnets
requirements correctness, termination liveness, safety trust, privacy
tools programming languages specification languages scripting languages
Table 1: Paradigm shifts in computation
age middle ages modern times postmodern times
space computer center cyber space cyber-social space
assets computing resources information public and private resources
requirements availability, authorization integrity, confidentiality trust, privacy
tools locks, tokens, passwords cryptography, protocols mining and classification
Table 2: Paradigm shifts in security
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Figure 3: Static security
of security. These dynamic aspects arise from the fact that
sooner or later, the enemies will emerge inside the fortress:
they will scale the walls at night (i.e. break the crypto), or
sneak past the gatekeepers (break the protocols), or build
up trust and enter with honest intentions, and later defect
to the enemy; or enter as moles, with the intention to strike
later. In any case, security is not localized at the security
perimeters of Fig. 3, but evolves in-depth, like on Fig. 4,
through social processes, like trust, privacy, reputation, in-
fluence.
Figure 4: Dynamic security
In summary, besides the methods to keep the attackers
out, security is also concerned with the methods to deal with
the attackers once they get in. Security researchers have
traditionally devoted more attention to the former family of
methods. Insider threats have attracted a lot of attention
recently, but a coherent set of research methods is yet to
emerge.
Interestingly, though, there is a sense in which security
becomes an easier task when the attacker is in. Although
unintuitive at the first sight, this idea becomes natural when
security processes are viewed in a broad context of the infor-
mation flows surrounding them (and not only with respect
to the data designated to be secret or private). To view
security processes in this broad context, it is convenient to
model them as games of incomplete information [4], where
the players do not have enough information to predict the
opponent’s behavior. For the moment, let me just say that
the two families of security methods (those to keep the at-
tackers out, and those to catch them when they are in) cor-
respond to two families of strategies in certain games of in-
complete information, and turn out to have quite different
winning odds for the attacker, and for defender. In fact,
they have the opposite winning odds.
In the fortress mode, when the defenders’ goal is to keep
the attackers out, it is often observed that the attackers
only need to find one attack vector to enter the fortress,
whereas the defenders must defend all attack vectors to pre-
vent them. When the battle switches to the dynamic mode,
and the defense moves inside, then the defenders only need
to find one marker to recognize and catch the attackers,
whereas the attackers must cover all their markers. This
strategic advantage is also the critical aspect of the immune
response, where the invading organisms are purposely sam-
pled and analyzed for chemical markers. Some aspects of
this observation have, of course, been discussed within the
framework of biologically inspired security. Game theoretic
modeling seems to be opening up a new dimension in this
problem space. We present a sketch to illustrate this new
technical and conceptual direction.
3.2 The game of attack vectors
Arena. Two players, the attacker A and the defender D,
battle for some assets of value to both of them. They are
given equal, disjoint territories, with the borders of equal
length, and equal amounts of force, expressed as two vector
fields distributed along their respective borders. The players
can redistribute the forces and move the borders of their
territories. The territories can thus take any shapes and
occupy any areas where the players may move them, obeying
the constraints that
(i) the length of the borders of both territories must be
preserved, and
(ii) the two territories must remain disjoint, except that
they may touch at the borders.
It is assumed that the desired asset Θ is initially held by the
defender D. Suppose that storing this asset takes an area
of size θ. Defender’s goal is thus to maintain a territory pD
with an area
∫
pD ≥ θ. Attacker’s goal is to decrease the
size of pD below θ, so that the defender must release some of
the assetΘ . To achieve this, the attacker A must bring his2
forces to defender D’s borders, and push into his territory.
A position in the game can thus be something like Fig. 5.
Game. At each step in the game, each player makes a move
by specifying a distribution of his forces along his borders.
Both players are assumed to be able to redistribute their
forces with equal agility. The new force vectors meet at
the border, they add up, and the border moves along the
resulting vector. So if the vectors are, say, in the opposite
2I hope no one minds that I will be using ”he” for both
Attacker and Defender, in an attempt to avoid distracting
connotations.
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directions, the forces subtract and the border is pushed by
the greater vector.
The players observe each other’s positions and moves in
two ways:
(a) Each player knows his own moves, i.e. distributions,
and sees how his borders change. From the change in
the previous move, he can thus derive the opponent’s
current distribution of the forces along the common
part of the border.
(b) Each player sees all movement in the areas enclosed
enclosed within his territory, i.e. observes any point on
a straight line between any two points that he controls.
That means that each player sees the opponent’s next
move at all points that lie within the convex hull of his
territory, which we call range.
According to (b), the position in Fig. 5 allows A to see D’s
next move. D, on the other hand only gets to know A’s move
according to (a), when his own border changes. This depicts,
albeit very crudely, the information asymmetry between the
attacker and the defender.
Question. How should rational players play this game?
3.2.1 Fortification strategy
Goals. Since each player’s total force is divided by the
length of his borders, the maximal area defensible by a given
force has the shape of a disk. All other shapes with the
boundaries of the same length enclose smaller areas. So D’s
simplest strategy is to acquire and maintain the smallest disk
shaped territory of size θ.3 This is the fortification strategy:
D only responds to A’s moves.
A’s goal is, on the other hand, to create ”dents” in D’s
territory pD, since the area of pD decreases most when its
convexity is disturbed. If a dent grows deep enough to reach
across pD, or if two dents in it meet, then pD disconnects
in two components. Given a constant length of the border,
it is easy to see that the size of the enclosed area decreases
exponentially as it gets broken up. In this way, the area
enclosed by a border of given length can be made arbitrarily
small.
But how can A create dents? Wherever he pushes, the
defender will push back. Since their forces are equal and
constant, increasing the force along one vector decreases the
force along another vector.
Optimization tasks. To follow the fortification strategy,
D just keeps restoring pD to a disk of size θ. To counter
D’s defenses, A needs to find out where they are the weak-
est. He can observe this wherever D’s territory pD is within
A’s range, i.e. contained in the convex hull of pA. So A
needs to maximize the intersection of his range with D’s
territory. Fig. 5 depicts a position where this is achieved: D
is under A’s siege. It embodies the Fortification Principle,
that the defender must defend all attack vectors, whereas
the attacker only needs to select one. For a fast push, A
3This is why the core of a medieval fortification was a round
tower with a thick wall and a small space inside. The fortress
itself often is not round, because the environment is not flat,
or because the straight walls were easier to build; but it
is usually at least convex. Later fortresses, however, had
protruding towers — to attack the attacker. Which leads us
beyond the fortification strategy. . .
Defense
Attack
Figure 5: Fortification
Defense
Attack
Figure 6: Honeypot
Defense
Attack
Figure 7: Sampling
Defense
Attack
Figure 8: Adaptation
randomly selects an attack vector, and waits for D to push
back. Strengthening D’s defense along one vector weakens
it along another one. Since all of D’s territory is within A’s
range, A sees where D’s defense is the weakest, and launches
the next attack there. In contrast, D’s range is initially lim-
ited to his own disk shaped territory. So D only ”feels” A’s
pushes when his own borders move. At each step, A pushes
at D’s weakest point, and creates a deeper dent. A does
enter into D’s range, but D’s fortification strategy makes
no use of the information that could be obtained about A.
The number of steps needed to decrease pD below θ depends
on how big are the forces and how small are the contested
areas.
3.2.2 Adaptation strategy
What can D do to avoid the unfavorable outcome of the
fortification strategy? The idea is that he should learn to
know his enemy: he should also try to shape his territory
to maximize the intersection of his range with A’s territory.
D can lure A into his range simply letting A dent his terri-
tory. This is the familiar honeypot approach, illustrated on
Fig. 6. Instead of racing around the border to push back
against every attack, D now gathers information about A’s
next moves within his range. For this, he sacrifices a little
bit of his territory, as a bait (the ”honey”) for A. If A sticks
with his strategic preferences, he will accept D’s sacrifice,
and enter into D’s range more and more. Fig. 7 depicts a
further step in D’s strategic development, where he does not
just passively wait for A to enter the honeypot, but actively
herds A into it. This is the sampling strategy. Formally, it
is characterized by D’s higher valuation for the information
about A, than for the territory alone. This is reflected in
the fact that D’s territory gradually evolves into a shape op-
timized for information gathering. In the cyber wars of the
day, the sampling strategy is emerging, e.g., among the re-
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searchers who have gone beyond luring some bots into some
sandboxed computers, and hijacked parts of botnets from
their owners, for the sole purpose of research [46, 45]. Con-
tinuing in this direction leads to the long term strategy of
adaptation, depicted on Fig. 8, where all of D’s strategic val-
uation is assigned to the information about the opponent.
Here A’s attacks are actively observed and prevented; the
territory is maintained as a side effect of keeping the oppo-
nent localized. In the long term, D wins. The proviso is
that D has enough territory to begin with. A simplifying
assumption of the presented model is that A blindly sticks
with his valuation of the territory, leading him to accept all
baits. Reality is, of course, not so simple, and A’s strategy
also allows various refinements. However, to achieve his goal
of stealing D’s assets, A cannot avoid entering D’s range al-
together. D, on the other hand, cannot allow that the size
of his territory drops below θ. Respecting these asymmetric
constraints, both players’ strategy refinements will evolve
methods to trade territory for information, making increas-
ingly efficient use of both.
A formalism for a mathematical analysis of this game is
sketched in the Appendix.
3.3 What does all this mean for security?
The presented toy model provides a very crude picture of
the evolution of defense strategies from fortification to adap-
tation. Intuitively, Fig. 5 can be viewed as a fortress under
siege, whereas Fig. 8 can be interpreted as a macrophage
localizing an invader. The intermediate pictures show the
adaptive immune system luring the invader and sampling
his chemical markers.
But there is nothing exclusively biological about the adap-
tation strategy. Figures 5–8 could also be viewed entirely in
the context of Figures 3–4, and interpreted as the transi-
tion from the medieval defense strategies to modern politi-
cal ideas. Fig. 8 could be viewed as a depiction of the idea
of ”preemptive siege”: while the medieval rulers tried to
keep their enemies out of their fortresses, some of the mod-
ern ones try to keep them in their jails. The evolution of
strategic thinking illustrated on Figures 5-8 is pervasive in
all realms of security, i.e. wherever the adversarial behaviors
are a problem, including cyber-security.
And although the paradigm of keeping an eye on your en-
emies is familiar, the fact that it reverts the odds of security
and turns them in favor of the defenders does not seem to
have received enough attention. It opens up a new game
theoretic perspective on security, and suggests a new tool
for it.
4. ABRANDNEWSECURITYPARADIGM:
APPLIED SECURITY BY OBSCURITY
4.1 Gaming security basics
Games of information. In games of luck, each player
has a type, and some secrets. The type determines player’s
preferences and behaviors. The secrets determine player’s
state. E.g., in poker, the secrets are the cards in player’s
hand, whereas her type consists of her risk aversion, her
gaming habits etc. The imperfect information means that
all players’ types are a public information, whereas their
states are unknown, because their secrets are private. In
games of incomplete information, both players’ types and
their secrets are unknown. The basic ideas and definitions
of the complete and incomplete informations in games go all
the way back to von Neumann and Morgenstern [48]. The
ideas and techniques for modeling incomplete information
are due to Harsanyi [20], and constitute an important part
of game theory [30, 18, 4].
Security by secrecy. If cryptanalysis is viewed as a game,
then the algorithms used in a crypto system can be viewed
as the type of the corresponding player. The keys are, of
course, its secrets. In this framewrok, Claude Shannon’s slo-
gan that ”the enemy knows the system” asserts that crypt-
analysis should be viewed as a game of imperfect informa-
tion. Since the type of the crypto system is known to the
enemy, it is not a game of incomplete information. Another
statement of the same imperative is the Kerckhoffs’ slogan
that ”there is no security by obscurity”. Here the obscurity
refers to the type of the system, so the slogan thus suggests
that the security of a crypto system should only depend on
the secrecy of its keys, and remain secure if its type is known.
In terms of physical security, both slogans thus say that the
thief should not be able to get into the house without the
right key, even if he knows the mechanics of the lock. The
key is the secret, the lock is the type.
Security by obscurity. And while all seems clear, and we
all pledge allegiance to the Kerckhoffs’ Principle, the prac-
tices of security by obscurity abound. E.g., besides the locks
that keep the thieves out, many of us use some child-proof
locks, to protect toddlers from dangers. A child-proof lock
usually does not have a key, and only provides protection
through the obscurity of its mechanism.
On the cryptographic side, security by obscurity remains
one of the main tools, e.g., in Digital Rights Management
(DRM), where the task is to protect the digital content from
its intended users. So our DVDs are encrypted to prevent
copying; but the key must be on each DVD, or else the DVD
could not be played. In order to break the copy protection,
the attacker just needs to find out where to look for the key;
i.e. he needs to know the system used to hide the key. For a
sophisticated attacker, this is no problem; but the majority
is not sophisticated. The DRM is thus based on the second-
hand but almost-new paradigm from the preceding section:
the DVD designers study the DVD users and hide the keys
in obscure places. From time to time, the obscurity wears
out, by an advance in reverse engineering, or by a lapse of
defenders attention4. Security is then restored by analyzing
the enemy, and either introducing new features to stall the
ripping software, or by dragging the software distributors to
court. Security by obscurity is an ongoing process, just like
all of security.
4The DVD Copy Scramble System (CSS) was originally re-
verse engineered to allow playing DVDs on Linux computers.
This was possibly facilitated by an inadvertent disclosure
from the DVD Copy Control Association (CAA). DVD CAA
pursued the authors and distributors of the Linux DeCSS
module through a series of court cases, until the case was
dismissed in 2004 [16]. Ironically, the cryptography used in
DVD CSS has been so weak, in part due to the US export
controls at the time of design, that any computer fast enough
to play DVDs could find the key by brute force within 18
seconds [43]. This easy cryptanalytic attack was published
before DeCSS, but seemed too obscure for everyday use.
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4.2 Logical complexity
What is the difference between keys and locks? The
conceptual problem with the Kerckhoffs Principle, as the re-
quirement that security should be based on secret keys, and
not on obscure algorithms, is that it seems inconsistent, at
least at the first sight, with the Von Neumann architecture
of our computers, where programs are represented as data.
In a computer, both a key and an algorithm is a string of
bits. Why can I hide a key and cannot hide an algorithm?
More generally, why can I hide data, and cannot hide pro-
grams?
Technically, the answer boils down to the difference be-
tween data encryption and program obfuscation. The task
of encryption is to transform a data representation in such
a way that it can be recovered if and only if you have a key.
The task of obfuscation is to transform a program repre-
sentation so that the obfuscated program runs roughly the
same as the original one, but that the original code (or some
secrets built into it) cannot be recovered. Of course, the lat-
ter is harder, because encrypted data just need to be secret,
whereas an obfuscated program needs to be secret and and
to run like the original program. In [5], it was shown that
some programs must disclose the original code in order to
perform the same function (and they disclose it in a non-
trivial way, i.e. not by simply printing out their own code).
The theory here confirms the empiric evidence that reverse
engineering is, on the average5, effective enough that you
don’t want to rely upon its hardness. So it is much easier
to find out the lock mechanism, than to find the right key,
even in the digital domain. When they say that there is
no security by obscurity, security practitioners thus usually
mean that reverse engineering is easy, whereas cryptanalysis
is hard, and provides more durable security guarantees.6
One-way programming? Modern cryptography is based
on one way functions, which are easy to compute, but hard
to invert. Secure systems are designed to use the easy direc-
tion of one-way functions, whereas the attacks must invert
them, i.e. compute the hard direction. A high level view
thus displays security as a process where the attackers pro-
gram attack algorithms in response to the algorithms of the
system that they attack, whereas the defenders program sys-
tem algorithms in response to some attacks. The question is
now whether systems can be designed in such a way to make
the defenders’ programming tasks easy, and the attackers’
programming tasks hard. Can we lift the idea of one-way
functions to one-way programming?
Let us take a closer look. How can we make attacker’s
task harder? Since obfuscation is hard and reverse engi-
neering is easy, we assume that the system code is accessi-
ble to the attacker, and that the attack code is accessible to
the defender. This assumption is supported by the current
security practices, where the attacker communities reverse
engineer their target systems, and the security researchers
decompile malware. But even when the code is completely
transparent, the attacker’s task of uncovering vulnerabilities
of the system remains nontrivial. And even with a trove of
5However, the International Obfuscated C Code Contest [23]
has generated some interesting and extremely amusing work.
6It is interesting to note that one of the initial ideas for
public key crypto system, suggested in [13], was to partially
evaluated a symmetric encryption module over its key, and
to publish its obfuscation as a public encryption module.
detected vulnerabilities, the attacker still needs to design an
effective attack algorithm to exploit them. The hard part
of an attacker’s job is thus the logical task to analyze the
system, and to design and implement an attack algorithm.
The logical complexity of such tasks is different from the
computational complexity of the system and the attack al-
gorithms. Indeed, a computationally easy algorithm may be
logically hard to construct, even when it can be expressed
by a relatively succinct program, like e.g. [2]; whereas an
algorithm that requires a minor logical effort to construct
may, of course, require a great computational effort to run.
The different roles of the computational and the logical
complexities in security can perhaps be pondered on the fol-
lowing example. In modern cryptography, a system C would
be considered very secure if an attack algorithm AC on it
would yield a proof that P = NP . But how would you feel
about a crypto system L such that an attack algorithm AL
would yield a proof that P "= NP? What is the difference
between the reductions
AC =⇒ P = NP and AL =⇒ P "= NP ?
The security of the system C is based on the computational
complexity of the NP problems. The security of the system
L is based on the logical complexity of proving P "= NP .
Most computer scientists believe that P "= NP is true. If
P = NP is thus false, then no attack on the system C can
exist, whereas an attack on the system L may very well be
possible. So the security of the system Lmay very well based
on the obscurity of the proof of P "= NP , which most likely
exists, but is very hard to find. The best minds of mankind
have spent many years looking for this proof, but did not
manage to find it. Yet an attack AL, together with the se-
curity reduction AL =⇒ P "= NP , would provide such a
proof. This attack would probably be welcomed with admi-
ration and gratitude. In fact, the system L is secure enough
to protect a bank account with a $1,000,000, since proving
(or disproving) P "= NP is worth a Clay Institute Mille-
nium Prize of $ 1,000,000. If an attacker takes your money
from the bank account, he will leave you with a proof worth
much more. So the logical complexity of the system L pro-
vides enough obscurity for a significant amount of security!
But what is logical complexity? Computational com-
plexity of a program tells how many computational steps
(counting them in time, memory, state changes, etc.) does
the program take to transform its input into its output. Log-
ical complexity is not concerned with the execution of the
program, but with its logical construction. Intuitively, if
computational complexity of a program counts the number
of computational steps needed to execute it on an input of a
given length, its logical complexity should count the number
of computational steps needed to derive that program from
some given programming knowledge. For instance, while
the computational complexity of an attack on a crypto sys-
tem is the the number of computational steps that it re-
quires to extract some information about the plaintext from
the cyphertext, the logical complexity of that attack is the
number of logical steps needed to find that attack algorithm
from a given description of the system algorithm. In other
words, the logical complexity of an attack on a crypto sys-
tem is the computational complexity of the task of finding
a counterexample for the security claim of that system.7
7Such claims are usually stated in the form: ”For all prob-
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The idea is thus to define logical complexity of an al-
gorithm A as the computational complexity of the fastest
construction algorithm PA that outputs A, given some algo-
rithmic knowledge as the input. The problem in formalizing
this is that the fastest program that outputs A is the pro-
gram print A, which does not need any input, since A is
hardwired in it. To assure that A is constructed in a non-
trivial way, we need to look for a constructor PA that is the
fastest among the algorithms that can be implemented by
programs significantly shorter than A itself.
This brings us into the realm of algorithmic information
theory [11, 28, 29], where similar concepts, with slight varia-
tions, have been proposed under a variety of different names.
Bennett’s logical depth [7] seems to be the the closest. In
Bennett’s original formulation, logical depth is defined as
a complexity measure assigned to data, or to observations,
although Bennett’s fascinating analyses also assign logical
depth to genes and to organisms, as the time that it took
them to evolve [6]. The step from logical depth of data
to logical complexity of algorithms boils down to the view
of algorithms-as-programs-as-data, originating from Go¨del’s
enumeration of recursive functions as numbers, and from
Kleene’s recursive indices. Towards a brief, somewhat over-
simplified, but hopefully not misleading account of these
formalisms, consider the partial algebraic theory with two
sorts,
• N, representing the data, say as numbers, and
• M, representing a family of algorithms, viewed as par-
tial functions N∗ ⇀ N, say those that can be realized
by Turing machines8,
given together with the mappings
M
!−"
N
{−}
(1)
which make them isomorphic, i.e.
{!M"} = and !{n}" = n
This means not just that every machine M ∈ M can be
encoded as a number !M" ∈ N, but also that any number
n ∈ N can be viewed as a program corresponding to the
machine {n} ∈ M, and executed on data. In addition, there
are also
• a universal composition machine U ∈ M, such that for
all P,Q ∈ M and all x ∈ N
U(!P" , !Q" , n) = P (Q(n)) (2)
holds whenever either side is defined,
• a time counter T ∈ M, where T (!M" , n) denotes the
number of steps that the machine M takes before it
halts on the input n, and
abilistic polynomial-time Turing machines that the attacker
may use, his advantage is not greater than [some formula]”.
The logical complexity of the attack is the computational
complexity of attacker’s task of finding that attack.
8More precisely, they are realized as self-delimiting Turing
machines, which allows them to receive multiple arguments
on the same tape [49].
• a length function # : N→ N, assigning a to each piece
of data its length.
Towards formalizing the above idea of logical complexity, we
now define the algorithmic distance C(A,B) between the al-
gorithms A,B ∈ M to be the length of the shortest program
p that inputs the code !A" and outputs the code !B":
C(A,B) =
∧
{p}(!A")=!B"
#(p) (3)
The logical distance D(A,B) is now the shortest time that
it takes to compute !B" from !A" by one of the shortest
programs:
D(A,B) =
∧
{p}(!A")=!B"
!(p)=C(A,B)
T (p, !A") (4)
Remarks. Algorithmic distance is based on the relativized
version of Solomonoff’s and Kolmogorov’s definitions of com-
plexity [41, 26]. Logical distance is based on a relativized
and simplified version of Bennett’s logical depth [7]. It is
simplified in the sense that it does not take into account
the possibility that slightly longer programs may run signif-
icantly faster. To capture this, the developed definitions of
logical depth are parametrized over the difference in length
between the fastest and the shortest programs. In some ap-
plications, this is an important technical detail, assuring the
stability of the definition. In the current presentation, which
is mainly conceptual, it would just complicate the definition.
A conceptual detail which is also omitted is that the univer-
sal composition machine, and the programs in (3) and (4)
need to be homomorphisms with respect to certain logical
operations on programs. This additional requirement seems
essential for the envisioned applications of logical distance
as a tool of security by obscurity. Nevertheless, such matters
must be left for future work. The path towards program and
specification frameworks that would take into account the
logical distances of algorithms, and advance the idea of one-
programming, requires examining the diverse refinements of
the basic idea of the Go¨del-Kleene program encodings that
in the meantime emerged from the theory and the extensive
experience of program development [21, 10, 15, 39, 32, 38].
Logical security. The idea of logical security is to make the
derivation of an attack algorithm from a system algorithm
logically complex. Formally, a system S would thus be log-
ically security if the distance D(S,A) is large for all attacks
A on S. On the other hand, since the distance is obviously
not symmetric, D(A,S) may be small, meaning that it may
be easy to derive an improved system algorithm S from an
undesired algorithm A. This connects logical security with
the idea of one-way programming.
At this point, the reader may object that it does not make
much sense to call D a distance when D(A,S) is generally
different from D(S,A). A possible answer to appeal to the
spatial intuition that S lays lower than A, so that getting
from S to A requires stranuous climbing, and from A to S
only breaking. But it gets worse. While algorithmic distance
satisfies the triangle law
C(P,Q) + C(Q,R) ≥ C(P,R) (5)
realized by the universal composition machine, logical dis-
tance generally does not satisfy this law, since there may
be a short but slow algorithm to construct R from P , but
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it does not have to go through Q, and all algorithms to
construct Q from P and R from Q may be long but fast.
Nevertheless, logical distance can be easily shown to satisfy
the weaker law
D(P,Q) +D(P ∧Q,R) ≥ D(P,R) (6)
where P ∧ Q denotes the parallel composition of P and Q,
i.e. an algorithm that satisfies P ∧ Q(x, y) = (u, v) if and
only if P (x) = u and Q(x) = v, for all x, y, u, v. One is
tempted to call this law ”subbayesian”, since it echoes the
Bayes’ law for conditional probabilities in the form
Pr(r | p) = Pr(r | q ∧ p) · Pr(q | p)
where p, q, r denote events. At any rate, we can now to use
(6) to bound the logical complexity D(S,A) of constructing
an attack A on a system S. For the particular case of the
system L, given with a security reduction AL =⇒ P "= NP ,
we first of all assume that we are given an effective algo-
rithm9 to transform any attack AL to a proof of P "= NP .
Denote the time complexity of the shortest such algorithm
by
d = D(AL, P "= NP )
where we abuse notation and write P "= NP for the algo-
rithm that outputs a proof of the statement P "= NP . Now
if the system L itself does not allow shortening of the proof
AL =⇒ P "= NP , i.e. if d ≥ D(L ∧ AL, P "= NP , then we
can get
D (L, AL) + d ≥ D (L, P "= NP )
as a substitution instance of (6). Going back to security by
obscurity, this means that, although L may be vulnerable to
a computationally easy attack AL, constructing this attack
may be logically hard, nearly as hard as deriving a proof of
P "= NP from it.
Logical complexity of randomized algorithms. While
logical complexity as a tool and resource for security will
clearly be built upon the deep and interesting results of
algorithmic information theory, it should be noted that a
realistic model of attacker’s logical practices will require al-
gorithmic information theory of randomized computation,
since the algorithms used in security tend to be random-
ized. The encoding in (1) will thus not be strict but only
approximate, with (2) replaced with
Pr (U(!P"ε , !Q"ε , x) = P (Q(x))) > ε (7)
4.3 Logical complexity of gaming security
Randomized logical complexity brings us back to security
as a game of incomplete information. In order to construct
a strategy each player in such a game must supplement the
available informations about the opponent by some beliefs.
Mathematically, these beliefs have been modeled, ever since
[20], as probability distributions over opponent’s payofffunc-
tions. More generally, in games not driven by payoffs, beliefs
9The constructivist imperative that an implication like
AL =⇒ P "= NP should be supported by an effective algo-
rithm transforming any proof of the antecedent into a proof
of the consequence was goes back to Brouwer [47]. Although
constructivism was deemed impractical by most mathemati-
cians, functional programming can be viewed as its practical
realization [19, 34, 35].
can be modeled as probability distributions over the possible
opponent’s behaviors, or algorithms. In terms of randomized
logical complexity, such a belief can thus be viewed as an
approximate logical specification of opponent’s algorithms.
Since both players in a game of incomplete information
are building beliefs about each other, they must also build
beliefs about each other beliefs: A formulates a belief about
B’s belief about A, and B formulates a belief about A’s be-
lief about B. And so on to the infinity. This is described
in more detail in the Appendix, and in still more detail in
[4]. These hierarchies of beliefs are formalized as probability
distributions over probability distributions. The framework
of approximate logical complexity now captures the way in
which the players encode their beliefs about each other’s
beliefs. This leads into an algorithmic theory of incomplete
information, where players’ belief hierarchies consist of sam-
plable probability distributions.
5. FINAL COMMENTS
On games of security and obscurity. The first idea of
this paper is that security is a game of incomplete informa-
tion: by analyzing your enemy’s behaviors and algorithms
(subsumed under what game theorists call his type), and by
obscuring your own, you can improve the odds of winning
this game.
This claim contradicts Kerckhoffs’ Principle that there is
no security by obscurity, which implies that security should
be viewed as a game of imperfect information, by asserting
that security is based on players’ secret data (e.g. cards),
and not on their obscure behaviors and algorithms.
I described a toy model of a security game which illus-
trates that security is fundamentally based on gathering and
analyzing information about the type of the opponent. This
model thus suggests that security is not a game of imper-
fect information, but a game of incompete information. If
confirmed, this claim implies that security can be increased
not only by analyzing attacker’s type, but also by obscuring
defender’s type.
On logical complexity. The second idea of this paper is
the idea of one-way programming, based on the concept of
logical complexity of programs. The suggestion is that al-
gorithmic information theory may be a useful new area for
security research. It provides a natural conceptual frame-
work for studying algorithm evolution driven by the battles
between the attackers and defenders. It also provides some
concrete technical tools, which raise a possibility of systems
vulnerable to computationally feasible, but logically unfeasi-
ble attacks; in other words, the attack algorithms that may
be easy to run when you know them, but hard to construct
if you don’t know them. Security experts dismiss such ideas,
mainly because the experience and theory show that algo-
rithms are never too hard to reconstruct from their obfus-
cations. But constructing them from other algorithms may
be genuinely hard.
On security of profiling. Typing and profiling are frowned
on in security. Leaving aside the question whether gathering
information about the attacker, and obscuring the system,
might be useful for security or not, these practices remain
questionable socially. The false positives arising from such
134
methods cause a lot of trouble, and tend to just drive the
attackers deeper into hiding.
On the other hand, typing and profiling are technically
and conceptually unavoidable in gaming, and remain re-
spectable research topics of game theory. Some games can-
not be played without typing and profiling the opponents.
Poker and the bidding phase of bridge are all about trying
to guess your opponents’ secrets by analyzing their behav-
iors. Players do all they can to avoid being analyzed, and
many prod their opponents to sample their behaviors. Some
games cannot be won by mere uniform distributions, with-
out analyzing opponents’ biases.
Both game theory and immune system teach us that we
cannot avoid profiling the enemy. But both the social ex-
perience and immune system teach us that we must set the
thresholds high to avoid the false positives that the profil-
ing methods are so prone to. Misidentifying the enemy leads
to auto-immune disorders, which can be equally pernicious
socially, as they are to our health.
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APPENDIX
A. GAMING SECURITY FORMALISM
Can the idea of applied security by obscurity be realized?
To test it, let us first make it more precise in a mathematical
model. I first present a very abstract model of strategic be-
havior, capturing and distinguishing the various families of
games studied in game theory, and some families not stud-
ied. The model is based on coalgebraic methods, along the
lines of [36]. I will try to keep the technicalities at a min-
imum, and the reader is not expected to know what is a
coalgebra.
A.1 Arenas
Definition 1. A player is a pair of sets A = 〈MA, SA〉,
where the elements of MA represent or moves available to
A, and the elements of SA are the states that Amay observe.
A simple response Σ : A → B for a player B to a player
A is a binary relation
Σ : MA × S2B ×MB → {0, 1}
WhenΣ( a,β,β ′, b) = 1, we write 〈a,β 〉 Σ−→ 〈β′, b〉, and say
that the strategy Σat B’s state β prescribes that B should
respond to A’s move a by the move b and update his state to
β′. The set of B’s simple responses to A is written SR(A,B).
A mixed response Φ : A → B for the player B to the
player A is a matrix
Φ : MA × S2B ×MB → [0, 1]
required to be finitely supported and stochastic in MA, i.e.
for every a ∈MA holds
• Φaββ′b = 0 holds for all but finitely many β,β ′ and b,
• ∑ββ′b Φaββ′b = 1.
WhenΦ aββ′b = p we write 〈a,β 〉 Φ−→
p
〈β′, b〉, and say that
the strategy Φat B’s state β responds to A’s move a with
a probability p by B’s move b leading him into the state β′.
The set of B’s mixed responses to A is written MR(A,B).
An arena is a specification of a set of players and a set of
responses between them.
Responses compose. Given simple responses Σ: A → B
and Γ: B → C, we can derive a response (Σ;Γ) : A→ C for
the player C against A by taking the player B as a ”man in
the middle”. The derived response is constructed as follows:
〈a,β 〉 Σ−→ 〈β′, b〉 〈b,γ 〉 Γ−→ 〈γ′, c〉
〈a,γ 〉 (Σ;Γ)−−−→ 〈γ′, c〉
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Following the same idea, for the mixed responses Φ: A→ B
and Ψ: B → C we have the composite (Φ;Ψ ) : A→ C with
the entries
(Φ;Ψ) aγγ′c =
∑
ββ′b
Φaββ′b ·Ψbγγ′c
It is easy to see that these composition operations are asso-
ciative and unitary, both for the simple and for the mixed
responses.
A.2 Games
Arenas turn out to provide a convenient framework for a
unified presentation of games studied in game theory [48,
33], mathematical games [8], game semantics [1, 22], and
some constructions in-between these areas [14]. Here we
shall use them to succinctly distinguish between the various
kinds of game with respect to the information available to
the players. As mentioned before, game theorists usually
distinguish two kinds of players’ information:
• data, or positions: e.g., a hand of cards, or a secret
number; and
• types, or preferences: e.g., player’s payoff matrix, or a
system that he uses are components of his type.
The games in which the players have private data or posi-
tions are the games of imperfect information. The games
where the players have private types or preferences, e.g. be-
cause they don’t know each other’s payoff matrices, are the
games of incomplete information. See [4] for more about
these ideas, [33] for the technical details of the perfect-
imperfect distinction, and [18] for the technical details of
the complete-incomplete distinction.
But let us see how arenas capture these distinction, and
what does all that have to do with security.
A.2.1 Games of perfect and complete information
In games of perfect and complete information, each player
has all information about the other player’s data and pref-
erences, i.e. payoffs. To present the usual stateless games in
normal form, we consider the players A and B whose state
spaces are the sets payoff bimatrices, i.e.
SA = SB = (R× R)MA×MB
In other words, a state σ ∈ SA = SB is a pair of maps
σ = 〈σA,σB〉 where σA is the MA ×MB-matrix of A’s pay-
offs: the entry σAab is A’s payoff if A plays a and B plays
b. Ditto for σB . Each game in the standard bimatrix form
corresponds to one element of both state spaces SA = SB .
It is nominally represented as a state, but this state does not
change. The main point here is that both A and B know
this element. This allows both of them to determine the
best response strategiesΣ A : B → A for A andΣ B : A→ B
for B, in the form
〈b,σ A〉 ΣA−−→ 〈σA, a〉 ⇐⇒ ∀x ∈MA. σAxb ≤ σAab
〈a,σ B〉 ΣB−−→ 〈σB , b〉 ⇐⇒ ∀y ∈MB . σBay ≤ σBab
and to compute the Nash equilibria as the fixed points of
the composites (ΣB ;ΣA) : A → A and (ΣA;ΣB) : B →
B. This is further discussed in [36]. Although the payo ff
matrices in games studied in game theory usually do not
change, so the corresponding responses fix all states, and
each response actually presents a method to respond in a
whole family of games, represented by the whole space of
payoff matrices, it is interesting to consider, e.g. discounted
payoffs in some iterated games, where the full force of the
response formalism over the above state spaces is used.
A.2.2 Games of imperfect information
Games of imperfect information are usually viewed in ex-
tended form, i.e. with nontrivial state changes, because
players’ private data can then be presented as their private
states. Each player now has a set if private positions, PA
and PB , which is not visible to the opponent. On the other
hand, both player’s types, presented as their payoffmatrices,
are still visible to both. So we have
SA = PA × (R× R)MA×MB
SB = PB × (R× R)MA×MB
E.g., in a game of cards, A’s hand will be an element of PA,
B’s hand will be an element of PB . With each response, each
player updates his position, whereas their payoffmatrices
usually do not change.
A.2.3 Games of incomplete information
Games of incomplete information are studied in epistemic
game theory [20, 30, 4], which is formalized through knowl-
edge and belief logics. The reason is that each player here
only knows with certainty his own preferences, as expressed
by his payoffmatrix. The opponent’s preferences and payoffs
are kept in obscurity. In order to anticipate opponent’s be-
haviors, each player must build some beliefs about the other
player’s preferences. In the first instance, this is expressed
as a probability distribution over the other player’s possi-
ble payoff matrices. However, the other player also builds
beliefs about his opponent’s preferences, and his behavior
is therefore not entirely determined by his own preferences,
but also by his beliefs about his opponent’s preferences. So
each player also builds some beliefs about the other player’s
beliefs, which is expressed as a probability distribution over
the probability distributions over the payoff matrices. And
so to the infinity. Harsanyi formalized the notion of players
type as an element of such information space, which includes
each player’s payoffs, his beliefs about the other player’s pay-
offs, his beliefs about the other player’s beliefs, and so on
[20]. Harsanyi’s form of games of incomplete information
can be presented in the arena framework by taking
SA = RMA×MB +∆SB
SB = RMA×MB +∆SA
where + denotes the disjoint union of sets, and∆ X es the
space of finitely supported probability distributions over X,
which consists of the maps p : X → [0, 1] such that
|{x ∈ X|p(x) > 0}| <∞ and
∑
x∈X
p(x) = 1
Resolving the above inductive definitions of SA and SB , we
get
SA = SB =
∞∏
i=0
∆i
(
RMA×MB
)
Here the state σA ∈ SA is thus a sequence
σA = 〈σA0 ,σA1 ,σA2 , . . .〉
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where σAi ∈ ∆iRMA×MB . The even components σA2i repre-
sent A’s payoffmatrix, A’s belief about B’s belief about A’s
payoffmatrix, A’s belief about B’s belief about A’s belief
about B’s belief about A’s payoff matrix, and so on. The
odd components σ2i+1A represent A’s belief about B’s payoff
matrix, A’s belief about B’s belief about A’s belief about B’s
payoff matrix, and so on. The meanings of the components
of the state σB ∈ SB are analogous.
A.3 Security games
We model security processes as a special family of games.
It will be a game of imperfect information, since the players
of security games usually have some secret keys, which are
presented as the elements of their private state sets PA and
PD. The player A is now the attacker, and the player D is
the defender.
The goal of a security game is not expressed through pay-
offs, but through ”security requirements” Θ ⊆ PD. The
intuition is that the defender D is given a family of assets to
protect, and the Θ are the desired states, where these assets
are protected. The defender’s goal is to keep the state of the
game inΘ , whereas the attacker’s goal is to drive the game
outsideΘ . The attacker may have additional preferences,
expressed by a probability distribution over his own private
states PA. We shall ignore this aspect, since it plays no role
in the argument here; but it can easily be captured in the
arena formalism.
Since players’ goals are not to maximize their revenues,
their behaviors are not determined by payoff matrices, but
by their response strategies, which we collect in the sets
RA(A,D) and RA(D,A). In the simplest case, response
strategies boil down to the response maps, and we take
RA(A,D) = SR(A,D), or RA(A,D) = MR(A,D). In gen-
eral, though, A’s and D’s behavior may not be purely ex-
tensional, and the elements of RA(A,D) may be actual al-
gorithms.
While both players surely keep their keys secret, and some
part of the spaces PA and PD are private, they may not know
each other’s preferences, and may not be given each other’s
”response algorithms”. If they do know them, then both
defender’s defenses and attaker’s attacks are achieved with-
out obscurity. However, modern security definitions usually
require that the defender defends the system against a fam-
ily of attacks without querying the attacker about his algo-
rithms. So at least the theoretical attacks are in principle
afforded the cloak of obscurity. Since the defender D thus
does not know the attacker A’s algorithms, we model se-
curity games as games of incomplete information, replacing
the player’s spaces of payoffmatrices by the spaces RA(A,D)
and RA(D,A) of their response strategies to one another.
Like above, A thus only knows PA and RA(D,A) with cer-
tainty, and D only knows PD and RA(A,D) with certainty.
Moreover, A builds his beliefs about D’s data and type, as a
probability distribution over PD × RA(A,D), and D builds
similar beliefs about A. Since they then also have to build
beliefs about each other’s beliefs, we have a mutually recur-
rent definition of the state spaces again:
SA =
(
PA × RA(D,A)
)
+∆SD
SD =
(
PD × RA(A,D)
)
+∆SA
Resolving the induction again, we now get
SA =
∞∏
i=0
∆2i
(
PA × RA(D,A)
)×∆2i+1(PD × RA(A,D))
SD =
∞∏
i=0
∆2i
(
PD × RA(A,D)
)×∆2i+1(PA × RA(D,A))
Defender’s state β ∈ SD is thus a sequence β = 〈β0,β1,β2, . . .〉,
where
• β0 = 〈βP0 ,βRA0 〉 ∈ PD × RA(A,D) consists of
– D’s secrets βP0 ∈ PD, and
– D’s current response strategy βRA0 ∈ RA(A,D)
• β1 ∈ ∆
(
PA×RA(D,A)
)
is D’s belief about A’s secrets
and her response strategy;
• β2 ∈ ∆2
(
PD ×RA(A,D)
)
is D’s belief about A’s belief
about D’s secrets and his response strategy;
• β3 ∈ ∆3
(
PA × RA(D,A)
)
is D’s belief about A’s belief
about D’s beliefs, etc.
Each response strategy Σ: A → D prescribes the way in
which D should update his state in response to A’s observed
moves. E.g., if RA(D,A) is taken to consist of relations in
the form Λ: M+D ×MA → {0, 1}, where M+D is the set of
nonempty strings in MD, then D can record the longer and
longer histories of A’s responses to his moves.
Remark. The fact that, in a security game, A’s state space
SA contains RA(D,A) and RA(A,D) means that each player
A is prepared for playing against a particular playerD; while
D is prepared for playing against A. This reflects the sit-
uation in which all security measures are introduced with
particular attackers in mind, whereas the attacks are built
to attack particular security measures. A technical conse-
quence is that players’ state spaces are defined by the in-
ductive clauses, which often lead to complex impredicative
structures. This should not be surprising, since even infor-
mal security considerations often give rise to complex belief
hierarchies, and the formal constructions of epistemic game
theory [20, 30, 17] seem like a natural tool to apply.
A.4 The game of attack vectors
We specify a formal model of the game of attack vec-
tors as a game of perfect but incomplete information. This
means that the players know each other’s positions, but need
to learn about each other’s type, i.e. plans and methods.
The assumption that the players know each other’s posi-
tion could be removed, without changing the outcomes and
strategies, by refining the way the model of players’ obser-
vations. But this seems inessential, and we omit it for sim-
plicity.
Let O denote the unit disk in the real plane. If we assume
that it is parametrized in the polar coordinates, then O =
{0} ∪ (0, 1] × R/2piZ, where R/2piZ denotes the circle. Let
R ⊆ R2 be an open domain in the real plane. Players’
positions can then be defined as continuous mappings of O
into R, i.e.
PA = PD = RO
The rules of the game will be such that the attacker’s and
the defender’s positions pA, pD ∈ RO always satisfy the con-
straint that
poA ∩ poD = ∅
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where po denotes the interior of the image of p : O → R.
The assumption that both players know both their own and
the opponent’s positions means that both state spaces SA
and SD will contain PA × PD as a component. The state
spaces are thus
SA = (PA × PD × RA(D,A)) +∆ SD
SD = (PA × PD × RA(A,D)) +∆ SD
To start off the game, we assume that the defender D is
given some assets to secure, presented as an areaΘ ⊆ R.
The defender wins as long as his position pD ∈ PD is such
thatΘ ⊆ poD. Otherwise the defender loses. The attacker’s
goal is to acquire the assets, i.e. to maximize the areaΘ ∩poA.
The players are given equal forces to distribute along the
borders of their respective territories. Their moves are the
choices of these distributions, i.e.
MA = MD = ∆ (∂O)
where ∂O is the unit circle, viewed as the boundary of O,
and ∆(∂O) denotes the distributions along ∂O, i.e. the
measurable functions m : ∂O → [0, 1] such that ∫
∂Om = 1.
How will D update his space after a move? This can be
specified as a simple response Σ: A → D. Since the point
of this game is to illustrate the need for learning about the
opponent, let us leave out players’ type information for the
moment, and assume that the players only look at their
positions, i.e. SA = SD = PA × PD. To specify Σ :A→ B,
we must thus determine the relation
〈mA, pA, pD〉 Σ−→ 〈p′A, p′D,mD〉
for any given mA ∈ MA, pA ∈ PA, and pD ∈ PD. We
describe the updates p′A and p
′
D for an arbitrary mD, and
leave it to D to determine which mDs are the best responses
for him. So given the previous positions and both player’s
moves, the new position p′A will map a point on the bound-
ary of the circle, viewed as a unit vector *x ∈ O into the
vector *p ′A(*x) in R ⊆ R2 as follows.
• If for all *y ∈ O and for all s ∈ [0,mA(*x)] and all t ∈
[0,mD(*y)] holds (1 + s)*pA(*x) "= (1 + t)*pD(*y) then set
*p ′A(*x) =
1 +mA(*x)
2
· *pA(*x)
• Otherwise, let *y ∈ O, s ∈ [0,mA(*x)] and t ∈ [0,mD(*y)]
be the smallest numbers such that (1+ s)*pA(*x) = (1+
t)*pD(*y). Writing m
′
A(*x) = mA(*x) − s and m′D(*y) =
mD(*y)− t, we set
*p ′A(*x) =
1 +m′A(*x)
2
· *pA(*x) + 1 +m
′
D(*y)
2
· *pD(*y)
This means that the player A will push her boundary by
mA(*x) in the direction *pA(*x) if she does not encounter D
at any point during that push. If somewhere during that
push she does encounter D’s territory, then they will push
against each other, i.e. their push vectors will compose.
More precisely, A will push in the direction *pA(*x) with the
force m′A(*x) = mA(*x) − s, that remains to her after the
initial free push by s; but moreover, her boundary will also
be pushed in the direction *pD(*y) by the boundary of D’s
territory, with the force m′D(*y) = mD(*y) − t, that remains
to D after his initial free push by t. Since D’s update is
defined analogously, a common boundary point will arise,
i.e. players’ borders will remain adjacent. When the move
next, there will be no free initial pushes, i.e. s and t will be
0, and the update vectors will compose in full force.
How do the players compute the best moves? Attacker’s
goal is, of course, to form a common boundary and to push
towardsΘ , preferably from the direction where the defender
does not defend. The defender’s goal is to push back. As
explained explained in the text, the game is thus resolved on
defender’s capability to predict attacker’s moves. Since the
territories do not intersect, butA’s moves become observable
for D along the part of the boundary of A’s territory that
lies within the convex hull of D’s territory, D’s moves must
be selected to maximize the length of the curve
∂pA ∩ conv(pD)
This strategic goal leads to the evolution described infor-
mally in Sec. 3.2.
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